File: Post-Mortems & Studies Intelligence Assessments 8 MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador William Leonhart, Senior FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Subject: Postmortems 1. In looking at some of the postmortems to sealerted policymakers to unfolding events, I read with observations on Iran and the fall of the Shah as we centering around the Sandinistas taking over Somozat treated from an intelligence standpoint alone. In we did note in some publications the unraveling nath happening in Iran. The assessment was that the Shal this undoubtedly prompted by the history of 1953 event was sessed Somoza as having a 50/50 chance of hange could judge that our intelligence missed the boat. 2. What is missing in the postmortems, however policy shifts played in altering the course of event beyond any prognosis for intelligence to predict. 3. In Iran, the judgment was when things really would call out the military much as he did in 1953 and the dissident movement. In Iran, the analysts of	gence e how intelligence th interest your ll as Nicaragua . Each subject was the case of the Shah, ure of events n could hang in there, ents. In Nicaragua.
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would call out the military much as he did in 1953 a	ts dramatically far
the US Government would end up sending General Huyse quell the military from any involvement. In Nicarage that the US policy would shift from supporting Somower cut off all aid and assistance and took effort distinct undermine the Somoza rule.	and squash Khomeini could not predict that er on a mission to gua, no one predicted za to the point where
4. I guess my bottom line is that I feel that prints account the shifts of policy which cannot be printelligence analyst and somehow point out that the not intelligence but the results of the policy winds directions.	redicted by the failures were really

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